IPv6 Network Administration

Security

IPv4 was designed with a network of relatively trusted users in mind where the network infrastructure was likely to be relatively secure and the information that was being transmitted was relatively public. Consequently, it did not seem important at the time to include security features, like non-repudiation or authentication, directly into the protocol.

But over its lifetime, the way the IPv4 Internet has been used has changed radically. The huge number of users of the Internet mean that trusting them all is simply not an option. The network infrastructure itself now involves cooperation between a large number of public and private organizations, with wildly differing agendas. Most significantly, the data that is being transmitted on the Internet now is often commercially, financially or personally sensitive. From a security perspective, IPv4 is way out of its depth.

As a consequence of its origin, security in the IPv4 world has not been provided by the basic, underlying transport protocol. Instead, as the need has arisen, application level security (one time passwords, SSH, TSIG, etc.) or manipulation of the protocols (packet filters and firewalls) have been introduced to provide security. These solutions have often had an ad-hoc character, and have suffered the attendant limitations: different management schemes, different levels of security provided, and duplicated effort. SSL, the most successful of these compromises, has been designed in such a way that it can be applied in situations other than HTTP, for which it was originally devised.^[4]

We'll briefly consider the implications of security not being provided by IPv4 itself—particularly in the case of DNS—but the same issues apply to most IP-based protocols, and protocols underlying IP, such as ARP (see the Section 1.4 later in this chapter).

DNS

From a security perspective, the gods have not smiled on DNS over IPv4. Most queries are conducted over UDP. The UDP protocol, while being lightweight and kind to small CPUs, is easily tampered with. The protocol fields can be guessed in many cases, and where they can't, it's possible to use a flooding technique to populate the wire with candidate packets, one of which may be mistaken for the real one. DNS itself has a few additional protections, but they do not amount to much. To fake a response to a DNS request you must correctly guess an ephemeral port number and a query-ID. In the case of DNS the port numbers are often easy to determine and some DNS implementations produce guessable query-IDs.

If you can fake DNS responses,^[5] it is then possible to direct people to the wrong host. If a convincing enough fake of some e-commerce site has been put up on an attacker-controlled web page, passwords or credit card numbers might then be stolen very easily. In the case of the web, some protection is possible if you are using SSL, but if a mail server were impersonated for example, few would notice that email had gone to the wrong destination until it was too late.

Layers of Networks

Networks are often thought of as being layered, where complex services are built up based on protocols stacked on top of each other. The canonical model that is dragged out to explain this is the 7-layer OSI model, shown in Table 1-2. This model is used to classify and analyze network protocols. As is the case with IP, there may not be a clean mapping from each of the seven layers to a specific protocol.

From this model, a few phrases have become common. We will often mention link-layer, layer 2 or MAC addressing—this is the low level addressing that allows IP to be carried over Ethernet, token rings, firewire and similar technology. We will mention layer 3, which is the level of IP packets. This is really where the big changes between IPv4 and IPv6 lie; the upper layers are largely unchanged.

Some people have extended the 7-layer model to a 9-layer model, which includes Layer 8, money, and Layer 9, politics. We would like to be able to tell you that IPv6 solves problems in these areas too, but IPv6's contribution to Layer 9 has so far been limited to making IPsec mandatory.

Table 1-2. 7 Layer OSI model

Layer	Name	Description	Example
7	Application	Applications and associated protocols	HTTP
6	Presentation	Data syntax and semantics	XDR
5	Session	Session management for applications	Â
4	Transport	Packetization, retransmission, ...	TCP
3	Network	How subnets interoperate	IP
2	Data Link	Management of interface	Ethernet (upper level)
1	Physical	Physical operation of the medium	Ethernet over UTP

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^[4] This light re-working of SSL is called TLS.

^[5] Doug Song's dsniff tools are designed to demonstrate some of the DNS and ARP vulnerabilities we talk about in this chapter. More information about dsniff can be found at http://naughty.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/.