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Telecommunication Network Economics

Book Description

Presenting a balance of theory and practice, this up-to-date guide provides a comprehensive overview of the key issues in telecommunication network economics, as well as the mathematical models behind the solutions. These mathematical foundations enable the reader to understand the economic issues arising at this pivotal time in network economics, from business, research and political perspectives. This is followed by a unique practical guide to current topics, including app stores, volume-based pricing, auctions for advertisements, search engine business models, the network neutrality debate, the relationship between mobile operators and mobile virtual network operators, and the economics of security. The guide discusses all types of players in telecommunications, from users, to access and transit network providers, to service providers (including search engines, cloud providers or content delivery networks), to content providers and regulatory bodies. Ideal for graduate students, researchers and industry practitioners working in telecommunications.

Table of Contents

  1. Cover
  2. Halftitle
  3. Title
  4. Copyright
  5. Table of Contents
  6. Preface
  7. 1 Introduction: telecommunications evolution and the set of actors
    1. 1.1 The evolution of telecommunications and the associated economic models
    2. 1.2 The need for modeling and analysis
      1. 1.2.1 The tragedy of the commons
      2. 1.2.2 The Braess paradox
      3. 1.2.3 Spectrum auctions
      4. 1.2.4 The network neutrality debate
    3. 1.3 A description of the actors
    4. 1.4 Goals of the book
    5. 1.5 Outline of the book
  8. 2 Mathematical foundations: optimization, game theory, auctions
    1. 2.1 Basic economic theory
      1. 2.1.1 Representing actor preferences
      2. 2.1.2 Effect of prices on demand
      3. 2.1.3 Global performance of an outcome
    2. 2.2 Mathematical tools
      1. 2.2.1 Continuous optimization methods
      2. 2.2.2 Fixed-point results
    3. 2.3 Game theory
      1. 2.3.1 Vocabulary and definitions
      2. 2.3.2 Non-atomic games
      3. 2.3.3 Bayesian games
      4. 2.3.4 Congestion games
      5. 2.3.5 Potential games
      6. 2.3.6 Stackelberg games
      7. 2.3.7 Repeated games
      8. 2.3.8 Further reading
    4. 2.4 Mechanism design and auctions
      1. 2.4.1 General principles and desirable properties
      2. 2.4.2 The revelation principle
      3. 2.4.3 Auctions: a specific type of mechanism
      4. 2.4.4 First-price auctions
      5. 2.4.5 Iterative open auctions
      6. 2.4.6 Second-price auctions
      7. 2.4.7 Revenue-equivalence results
      8. 2.4.8 Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions
      9. 2.4.9 Combinatorial auctions
      10. 2.4.10 Double-sided auctions
      11. 2.4.11 Towards computational mechanism design
    5. 2.5 Conclusion
  9. 3 Economics of access service providers
    1. 3.1 History and evolution of access pricing models
    2. 3.2 Expectations of users and ISPs, impact on other actors
    3. 3.3 Flat-rate pricing
    4. 3.4 Volume-based pricing
    5. 3.5 Congestion and value-based pricing
      1. 3.5.1 Pricing and connection acceptance control
      2. 3.5.2 Multiclass pricing
      3. 3.5.3 Auctions
      4. 3.5.4 Interference-based pricing for wireless networks
      5. 3.5.5 The Kelly mechanism
    6. 3.6 Economics of bundling
  10. 4 Economics at the content and application level
    1. 4.1 A bit of history
    2. 4.2 Advertising
      1. 4.2.1 Auctioning for advertising slots: basic principles
      2. 4.2.2 Auctions between advertisers
      3. 4.2.3 Extensions of the basic auction model
      4. 4.2.4 Pay-per-click or pay-per-view?
      5. 4.2.5 Learning
      6. 4.2.6 Existing tools/companies
    3. 4.3 Paid applications versus free applications with advertisements
    4. 4.4 Economics of clouds/grids
    5. 4.5 Economics of peer-to-peer systems
    6. 4.6 Economics of content delivery networks
  11. 5 Interactions among network service providers
    1. 5.1 Introduction
    2. 5.2 Auctions for wireless spectrum
      1. 5.2.1 Why use auctions?
      2. 5.2.2 Auction rules and evolution
      3. 5.2.3 Evolving from simultaneous ascending auctions …
      4. 5.2.4 … to incentive auctions
    3. 5.3 Competition between access providers
      1. 5.3.1 Association models based on user utility
      2. 5.3.2 Aggregated demand models
      3. 5.3.3 Providers competing in multiple-time-scale decision games
      4. 5.3.4 To license or not to license resources?
    4. 5.4 Client but competitor: the (unsustainable?) situation of MVNOs
      1. 5.4.1 Exploiting secondary markets
      2. 5.4.2 Can MNO–MVNO associations survive? Observations from different countries
      3. 5.4.3 Can MNO–MVNO associations survive? Theoretical approaches
    5. 5.5 The economics of interconnection
      1. 5.5.1 An example
      2. 5.5.2 The problem of incentivizing intermediate entities
      3. 5.5.3 Some proposals for ad-hoc networks or multi-hop cellular networks
    6. 5.6 The economics of community networks
  12. 6 Interactions among content or application service providers
    1. 6.1 Introduction
    2. 6.2 Competition at the content level
      1. 6.2.1 General models
      2. 6.2.2 Online TV competition
      3. 6.2.3 An illustrative model of competition among free CPs with advertising
    3. 6.3 A specific case: competition between search engines
    4. 6.4 The economics of network security
      1. 6.4.1 Economic models for security analysis
      2. 6.4.2 Competition among security providers
      3. 6.4.3 Collaboration/competition issues
  13. 7 Relations between content/application providers and access service providers
    1. 7.1 The evolution of economic relations between content/application and network providers
    2. 7.2 Value chain, vertical integration
      1. 7.2.1 Value chain and multi-sided markets
      2. 7.2.2 Vertical integration
    3. 7.3 The network neutrality issue
      1. 7.3.1 Introduction and historical facts
      2. 7.3.2 Arguments of proponents and opponents of neutrality
      3. 7.3.3 Modeling content and network providers’ interactions and analyzing neutrality issues
    4. 7.4 Search neutrality
      1. 7.4.1 The debate
      2. 7.4.2 Do search engines return biased results?
      3. 7.4.3 Do we need regulatory intervention?
      4. 7.4.4 Neutral versus non-neutral search engines: a simple model
      5. 7.4.5 The case of a general set of keywords
      6. 7.4.6 Personalization of search results: what I want to see versus what I need to see
  14. References
  15. Index