How Data Science Is Transforming Health Care

Chapter 4. Paying for Results

Once we’re on the road toward more effective health care, we can look at other ways in which Wanamaker’s problem shows up in the medical industry. It’s clear that we don’t want to pay for treatments that are ineffective. Wanamaker wanted to know which part of his advertising was effective, not just to make better ads, but also so that he wouldn’t have to buy the advertisements that wouldn’t work. He wanted to pay for results, not for ad placements. Now that we’re starting to understand how to make treatment effective, now that we understand that it’s more than rolling the dice and hoping that a treatment that works for a typical patient will be effective for you, we can take the next step: Can we change the underlying incentives in the medical system? Can we make the system better by paying for results, rather than paying for procedures?

It’s shocking just how badly the incentives in our current medical system are aligned with outcomes. If you see an orthopedist, you’re likely to get an MRI, most likely at a facility owned by the orthopedist’s practice. On one hand, it’s good medicine to know what you’re doing before you operate. But how often does that MRI result in a different treatment? How often is the MRI required just because it’s part of the protocol, when it’s perfectly obvious what the doctor needs to do? Many men have had PSA tests for prostate cancer; but in most cases, aggressive treatment of prostate cancer is a bigger risk than the disease itself. Yet the test itself is a significant profit center. Think again about Tamoxifen, and about the pharmaceutical company that makes it. In our current system, what does “100% effective in 80% of the patients” mean, except for a 20% loss in sales? That’s because the drug company is paid for the treatment, not for the result; it has no financial interest in whether any individual patient gets better. (Whether a statistically significant number of patients has side-effects is a different issue.) And at the same time, bringing a new drug to market is very expensive, and might not be worthwhile if it will only be used on the remaining 20% of the patients. And that’s assuming that one drug, not two, or 20, or 200 will be required to treat the unlucky 20% effectively.

It doesn’t have to be this way.

In the U.K., Johnson & Johnson, faced with the possibility of losing reimbursements for their multiple myeloma drug Velcade, agreed to refund the money for patients who did not respond to the drug. Several other pay-for-performance drug deals have followed since, paving the way for the ultimate transition in pharmaceutical company business models in which their product is health outcomes instead of pills. Such a transition would rely more heavily on real-world outcome data (are patients actually getting better?), rather than controlled clinical trials, and would use molecular diagnostics to create personalized “treatment algorithms.” Pharmaceutical companies would also focus more on drug compliance to ensure health outcomes were being achieved. This would ultimately align the interests of drug makers with patients, their providers, and payors.

Similarly, rather than paying for treatments and procedures, can we pay hospitals and doctors for results? That’s what Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are about. ACOs are a leap forward in business model design, where the provider shoulders any financial risk. ACOs represent a new framing of the much maligned HMO approaches from the ’90s, which did not work. HMOs tried to use statistics to predict and prevent unneeded care. The ACO model, rather than controlling doctors with what the data says they “should” do, uses data to measure how each doctor performs. Doctors are paid for successes, not for the procedures they administer. The main advantage that the ACO model has over the HMO model is how good the data is, and how that data is leveraged. The ACO model aligns incentives with outcomes: a practice that owns an MRI facility isn’t incentivized to order MRIs when they’re not necessary. It is incentivized to use all the data at its disposal to determine the most effective treatment for the patient, and to follow through on that treatment with a minimum of unnecessary testing.

When we know which procedures are likely to be successful, we’ll be in a position where we can pay only for the health care that works. When we can do that, we’ve solved Wanamaker’s problem for health care.