Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, Second Edition

Abstract

In this chapter I argue that tacit knowledge has largely been misunderstood in organization and management studies, mainly because of the tacitly (!) accepted cognitivist framework and the associated conduit metaphor of communication. I present a phenomenological critique of the cognitivist view, especially as the latter has been manifested in the work of Nonaka and Takeuchi, by drawing on, primarily, Polanyi and, secondarily, more recent phenomenological philosophers such as Dreyfus and Taylor. I argue against the conversion model of tacit knowledge and present an alternative account, which acknowledges the possibility of the articulation (albeit perennially incomplete) of tacit knowledge when skilled activities are obstructed. In such a case, practitioners cease to be absorbed in their skilled performances by subsidiarily drawing on familiar patterns, thus becoming focally aware of how their tasks at hand are accomplished. Distinctions underlying skilled performances thus come to the fore, becoming available for inspection and re-punctuation. The latter occurs most effectively when individuals are engaged in productive dialogical interactions.

‘Nisi credideritis, non intelligitis. (Unless ye believe, ye shall not understand.)

St Augustine (cited in Polanyi, 1962:266)

Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need to remind ourselves of.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953: No.89; italics ...