Cooperation, Coopetition and Innovation

2Cooperation and Transaction Costs Theory

2.1. Introduction

The “new” theories of the firm, which cover transaction costs, the theory of the agency (Chapter 3) and property rights theory (Chapter 4), all challenge the neo-classical paradigm of the firm according to which an “abstract” producer combines the factors of production in the most favorable way. In the 1970s and the 1980s, when this restrictive outlook no longer adapted to the complex reality of the firms, new theoretical approaches emerged, which placed firms at the heart of the analysis and incorporated other parameters such as uncertainty, information asymmetry, limited rationality and opportunism.

These thoughts around the notions of transaction, contract and coordination costs, with the ultimate aim of increasing performances, have been largely analyzed by many authors in the field of strategic management in order to better assess the phenomenon of cooperation. In this sense, alliances have emerged as an intermediate form between the market and the hierarchy, in that they reduce transaction costs while preventing an increase in organizational (or bureaucratic) costs.

2.2. The logics of transaction costs

According to the theory developed by [COA 37], resources can be allocated in two ways: either via the market or via the firm. The originality of this analysis lies in that the author acknowledges the existence of operating costs in the market. The system that relies on market-specific prices engenders transaction ...